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The Enemy Within: 




The experience of violence has powerful consequences in the 
transformation of history. The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake marked a 
moment of unprecedented material destruction and cultural rupture in the 
Japanese empire. The disaster soon became subject to human 
interpretation and political manipulation, for the trauma of the earth 
tremors and subsequent fire produced not only physical chaos, but also 
rumours and violence against the colonized in the metropolitan area. Such 
violence manifested itself in the massacre of Koreans immediately 
following the earthquake-triggered by rumours of arson, murder, and 
riots by Koreans in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Despite the shock of 
rumours and mayhem, the lack of critical evidence and the contradictions 
in testimony have rendered the incident an historical enigma in modern 
Japanese and Korean history. Interestingly, precisely because of this 
unsettled nature of the violence - which thus defies any singular narrative 
that satisfactorily explains the incident empirically - the event illuminates 
the development of subjective narratives on collective violence. In an 
attempt to explore the relationships that weave together disaster, rumours, 
massacre, and narrative-making in the culture of empire, this paper 
explores collective violence through the lens of rumours and vigilante trial 
discourse in the context of imperial Japan. 
Keywords: The Great Kanto Earthquake, the 1923 Massacre of Koreans, 
Rumours, the Japanese Empire, Vigilante, Collective Violence 
Too many experts on Rwanda have shied away from this 
troubling fact, the "popular" agency in the genocide, by 
casting the genocide as a state project and not also as a 
social project .... It is this fact that needs confronting, 
not because of what it can tell us of Rwanda and 
Rwandans, but because of what it can tell us about 
ourselves as political beings- as agents with a capacity 
to tap both the destructive and the creative potential in 
politics. 1 
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188 The Enemy Within 
The experience of violence has powerful consequences in the 
transformation of history and culture. The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake 
marked a moment of unprecedented material destruction as well as 
cultural rupture in modem Japanese history. As the natural disaster soon 
became subject to human interpretation and political manipulation, the 
traumatic experience of earth tremors and the subsequent fire brought not 
only rumours and chaos but also vigilante violence against colonized 
people in imperial Japan. Such social violence and cultural contestation 
manifested itself in the massacre of six thousand Koreans involving 
thousands of ordinary citizens in the Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan area, 
triggered by rumours of arson, murder and rebellious riots by the 
colonized people immediately following the earthquake. Despite the shock 
and memories of rumours and mass murder, lack of critical evidence and 
contradictions in existing documents have often rendered the incident as 
an "historical enigma,"2 if not "panic-driven aberration"3 or "imperialist 
conspiracy,',4 in modern Japanese and Korean history. 
Interestingly, precisely because of the controversial and 
obfuscated nature of the violence - which thus defies any singular master 
narrative that satisfactorily explains the incident empirically - the 
massacre of Koreans effectively sheds light on subjective narratives of 
collective violence, arising in response to the earthquake, rumours, 
massacre and the aftermath. The multiple responses and patterns of choice 
over the course of the event provide an excellent lens to explore the webs 
of relationships among disaster, rumour, violence and narrative-making, 
while revealing dynamic aspects of the human spirit under such extreme 
circumstances. In particular, two powerful social phenomena, the rise and 
spread of rumours against Koreans and the controversy over legal 
prosecution of the vigilantes, opened up an unusual space for the 
development of subjective narratives concerning the massacre while 
stimulating debate on the meaning of the "Japanese public" to be protected 
and promoted in the midst of turmoil. In an attempt to understand the 
complicated context and broader implications of the violent incident, this 
paper explores the politics of rumour and competing narratives in trial 
discourses following the massacre of Koreans in the multiethnic Japanese 
empire. By examining these cultural terrains and the social impact of the 
experience of violence, I call attention not only to the dynamic presence of 
the colonized in the metropolis but also to the power of hum.an 
imagination in producing and interpreting violence, thus the potential for 
both resisting and recovering from it. 
1. Earthquake, Rumours and Massacre 
As the hot air of the fire became unbearable in all 
directions, the refugees increasingly gathered in the 
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Jin-hee Lee 
centre of the square. Some were carrying suitcases, 
moneybags, books or musical instruments. Others were 
holding food in fear of starvation. But, as the open space 
decreased rapidly making it hard to remain standing, 
people began to yell at one another, "What good are all 
your possessions?" Eventually, the things would be fed 
to the fire, piece by piece. When it was time for the 
refugees to turn themselves to the flame, they cried out 
to gods and Buddhas .... 
From an earthquake survivor's memoir5 
189 
On September 1, 1923, the earth began to shake two minutes 
before noon causing the largest natural disaster in twentieth-century Japan. 
Violent wind and great fire followed, attacking the densely populated 
Tokyo metropolitan area and six other adjacent prefectures in the eastern 
part of Japan (Kanta). The calamity, resulting in 140,000 dead and 
missing, destroyed most homes in the city of Yokohama and over half of 
the homes in Tokyo.6 Like other great disasters, the earthquake brought 
out dramatic human stories of those caught up in it. The crisis effectively 
revealed people's priorities. To many faithful families, servants and 
friends, it was time to rescue and help one another. To the politically 
ambitious, it was an opportunity for advancement by appearing before the 
imperial family inquiring about their safety before others. Han, an 
earthquake survivor and young student from Korea - a colony of Japan 
since 1910 - was delivering newspapers, as he had done for the past three 
years to pay his tuition. On that Saturday afternoon, the newspaper 
distribution manager asked him to circulate the special issue on the 
outbreak of the earthquake in the midst of the falling flames and all-
consuming blaze. It did not take long for Han to stop and escape from the 
fire sweeping through the street where he was standing.7 Most newspapers 
in the capital area burned over that weekend, leaving the two million 
Tokyoites deprived of reliable sources of news in the midst of the 
catastrophe. 
Even more frightening to many earthquake survivors - and to Han 
and other Koreans for a different reason - were the rumours of arson, rape, 
poisoning, and organized attack by Koreans immediately following the 
quake. As rumours reached villages, many inhabitants organized jikeidan 
("self-defense associations" or vigilante groups) arming themselves for 
public security and self-protection.8 Their activities resulted in the violent 
lynching of Koreans that was most severe during the first week following 
the quake while exercising their authority in strict social surveillance. The 
townsmen expressed their fear of an impending attack by the colonized 
subjects, and many appreciated the vigilantes in a time of insufficient 
security after the breakdown of most public offices. At the same time, 
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190 The Enemy Within 
spectators of vigilante violence were intimidated by their own local men. 
Armed, they targeted passers-by, threatening or mistakenly mistreating 
them as Koreans. 
Numerous survivors witnessed and testified to the rumours and 
subsequent massacre of Koreans throughout the Kanto region. Observing 
the vigilantes' merciless hunting and persecution of Koreans, including 
women and children, some expressed mixed feelings of anger and 
sympathy toward the murdered Koreans. In fact, rumours against Koreans 
and the subsequent manmade disaster were so traumatic that many 
children top-listed the rumours among things that scared and frustrated 
them most.9 Fear of rumours as well as their experience of violence 
prevailed in their writings and paintings when the schools reopened after 
the earthquake. Remembering the first few nights she spent outdoors while 
watching the vigilantes running around, an elementary school child wrote 
that she would "die rather than endure the fear of attack by Koreans" once 
she thought she had survived the disaster. 10 Mysteriously, however, it is 
not clear where the rumours began, nor do we know the names or the 
exact numbers of the victims of the massacre. Various reports by 
government, military, police, and individuals were either not able to 
provide the appropriate explanations or contradicted each other in their 
accounts of the event. As a result, responsibility was blurred, thus leaving 
many important questions about the incident unanswered. 
When beginning my research, I anticipated critical findings that 
could fill the gap in my understanding of this strange incident where 
ordinary people massacred other ordinary men and women. However, 
further close analysis of existing primary sources revealed a lack of 
critical documentation and too much room for arbitrary interpretation. 
Indeed, as many of the textbook descriptions of the event and the 
surviving massacre memorial inscriptions reveal, the incident remains a 
social taboo or has often been dismissed in an overly simplified manner as 
an aberrational and panic-driven accident in the midst of chaos. 11 Thus, 
although the fact of the massacre remained with tens of thousands of 
participants and witnesses of the violence, its social and cultural impacts 
have not been fully considered in the historical formation and 
transformation of modern Japan. What I found on examining historical 
documents and testimonies was that, precisely because of these sustaining 
yet discursive memories, and due to the lack of tangible empirical 
evidence to establish the case with an authoritative singular narrative, the 
event opened up an unusual space for various subjective, competing 
narratives to develop thereafter. Existing documents reflect that different 
people acted in different ways, not only going through each of the 
developmental stages of the event - such as hearing the rumours, 
witnessing the massacre, and facing the trials - but also interpreting and 
remembering the moment of collective violence. 
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In the following, in an attempt to understand mechanisms of 
producing competing narratives of collective violence in the context of 
Japanese empire, I examine the mayhem through the lens of rumours and 
the vigilante trials. The exclusionary rumours reproduced prevalent 
colonial representations of colonized subjects while reflecting subjective 
beliefs about the perceived reality based on colonial relations among 
members of the post-quake metropolis. The following violence and trials 
set up an effective stage where multiple narratives of the violent moment 
emerged in public discourse. Through contextualization of the 
controversies in massacre discourse from the rise of rumours to the 
vigilante trials, I argue that rumour-mongering and violent outbreaks 
among citizens in the metropolis reveal social participation and popular 
agency in the practice and interpretation of the mass violence in the 
culture of empire. Simultaneously, I contend that the discourse of natural 
disaster and succeeding violence against colonized Koreans constituted 
and stimulated debate on the boundary of the "Japanese public" that was 
to be perceived and promoted in dealing with the destruction and 
reconstruction of the imperial centre of the empire. Thus, the 1923 
massacre of Koreans provides an excellent lens through which the impact 
of the presence of the colonized in the metropolis can be explored. As the 
lived and narrated experiences of the massacre conflicted in their 
subjective understandings of the shared moment of violence within the 
structure of colonialism and imperialism, the incident and subsequent 
social discourse can be best located in this process of producing narratives 
of colonial violence and coping with the reality of a multiethnic Japanese 
empire. Now let me turn to the "beginning" of the tragic incident in early 
twentieth-century Japanese and Korean history. 
2. The Metropolis between Rumours and Reality 
. . . no information is passed on unidirectionally. All 
concerned parties converse with each other, the rumour 
being the final consensus of their collective deliberations 
seeking out a convincing, encompassing explanation . . .. 
rumours entail a subjective construction of reality .. . The 
dividing line between information and rumour is 
subjective, resulting from our own conviction .... Once a 
rumour is qualified as a "rumour" by the public, it stops 
spreading.... What is at stake here is an altogether 
subjective value judgment. 12 
The prevalence of rumours in the midst of immense social 
destruction is not unique to Japan. Although the detailed contexts may 
vary, there have been similar kinds of rumours against ethnic, racial, or 
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religious minont1es at times of natural and social disasters throughout 
human history. 13 Nor were the rumours against Koreans the only kinds of 
rumours following the outbreak of the earthquake in the Japanese empire. 
The power of human imagination manifested itself in various kinds of 
rumours that followed the capital area's massive destruction. 14 For 
example, there were rumours of forthcoming natural disasters, such as 
impending aftershock, tidal waves and firestorms, as well as false 
information and exaggeration of the damage created by the catastrophe. 
Other rumours included those concerning imminent riots by liberated 
prisoners, socialists, and religious cult groups. Apocalyptic interpretations 
appeared as well, implying that survivors speculated on the causality and 
meaning of the catastrophe: it was seen as divine retribution from the 
heavens (tenbatsu or tenkenron). Some argued that Japan was being 
punished because of its great gains in Asia despite nominal participation in 
World War I, without having paid enough in costs for the war. 15 Others 
argued that the earthquake was sent by heaven to punish the arrogant 
people of Tokyo for their increasingly materialistic and lavish life style.16 
These rumours aggravated social unrest while further rumours even 
suggested the capital would be moved from Tokyo to another part of the 
nation. Still others took it as an opportunity to express their 
disillusionment with modern science and technology. They criticized a 
rapidly Westernizing Japan, arguing to revive values predating the 
nation's modernization era.17 
Nevertheless, not all rumours survived or had any significant 
impact. Yet, despite the absence of usual means of communication and 
media, rumours against the colonized Koreans spread throughout eastern 
Japan conspicuously and with surprising rapidity. The violent earth 
tremors stopped and the great winds and firestorms began to die down, but 
people were still terrified, not by the natural disaster but by the imagined 
impending attacks of arson, rape, poisoning, and organized riots by the 
colonized people in the centre of the empire. Various records, including 
police officer reports from various locations, government documents, and 
individual testimonies and memoirs, indicate that the rumours began to 
prevail in various parts of the Tokyo-Yokohama area as early as the first 
night following the earthquake and spread to every town in the region after 
the second day of the disaster. 18 There was a cry in the streets that Koreans 
were armed and had set fire to the city. Such rumours continued to spread 
by word of mouth in neighbourhoods. They warned against poisoned 
drinking water and the anticipated explosion of buildings and houses that 
Koreans had supposedly marked with unusual symbols. Handwritten 
posters and public announcements also spread the rumours, and the few 
available newspapers began to print what was going around as soon as 
they secured the means and facilities to do so. 19 Until then, alarm had been 
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chiefly about surviving the earthquake and escaping the fires, but now 
people's only concern was to counter the alleged invasion of Koreans. 
Those Koreans persecuted during post-quake turmoil were often 
labelled "malcontent" or "rebellious" (futei senjin), a politically charged 
pejorative term for those colonized subjects that appeared frequently in 
newspapers, magazines, and official documents. Various forms of Korea's 
independence movement were critical in shaping such negative images of 
Koreans in the urban centre, given colonial relations between Koreans and 
Japanese in the empire.20 The criteria for judging "malcontent" or 
"rebellious" Koreans were rooted in those Koreans' desires and efforts to 
restore their national sovereignty from Japan, especially after the March 
First Independence Movement in colonial Korea in 1919.21 Yet the origin 
or spread of rumours was not publicly queried until a month or so later, 
once the vigilante trials had begun. How rumours registered in people's 
minds was also discussed in relation to the public's evaluation of violence 
at the trials to follow. 
3. The Vigilante Trials: Contestation and Complicity 
Official policy and procedure for prosecuting vigilantes began to 
take shape on September 9 when top government officials formed a 
special judiciary council to deal with the post-earthquake violence within 
the Emergency Earthquake Relief Bureau.22 On September 18, newspapers 
reported policy on the arrest and trial of vigilantes, and the arrests began 
toward the end of the month followed by actual trials begun in late 
October and November.23 The number of officially prosecuted vigilante 
violence cases reached 139, involving 735 accused individuals across the 
Kanta area.24 The total number of vigilante groups at the time of the 
earthquake is not clearly known, especially considering the arbitrary ways 
in which criteria were established to label a defence group an 
"organization." There were vigilantes attacking Koreans following the 
spread of rumours not only in the Kanta area but also across the nation. As 
of mid-September, there were at least I, 145 vigilante groups within the 
Tokyo metropolitan prefecture alone, which increased to 1,593 by the end 
of October. The total number of vigilante organizations reached at least 
3,689 throughout the earthquake-stricken area, close to half of them in 
Tokyo.25 
The activities of vigilantes, illegally armed with guns, swords or 
skewers, included setting checkpoints to single out Koreans among the 
passers-by, either by asking for Japanese pronunciation difficult for 
Korean speakers, demanding the lyrics of Kimigayo (a praise song for the 
emperor; the national anthem), or observing physical features such as the 
shape of the back of the head or the cheekbones, hair, and relatively tall 
height. Then the vigilante groups either brought the Koreans to the police, 
military, or internment camps,26 or killed them on the spot, thus making 
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vigilante activities not "defence" of themselves but an offence against the 
imagined enemy within.21 In some cases, the local populace attacked not 
only the police stations where Koreans were either temporarily interned or 
had sought refuge,28 but also some Chinese and Japanese mistaken for 
Koreans.29 These violent deeds were the crimes of which the alleged 
vigilantes were accused at their trials. Nevertheless, the Kanto Vigilantes' 
Association and sympathizers vigorously protested the arrest and trial of 
vigilantes.30 What were the issues at stake in the trials? What were the 
discourses on the in/excusability of the violence in this legal process? 
How did various participants in the event see themselves and narrate the 
moment of violence against the colonized? Above all, what does it tell us 
about the human imagination and historical agency in practicing, 
representing, and narrating collective violence in the empire? 
Looking at the trials as a moment of public judgment of mass 
murder, the first controversy at court concerned the cause, focusing on the 
origin of rumours against colonized Koreans: Where did they begin, and 
how were they spread? Various records, including police files, 
government documents, and individual memoirs and testimonies, indicate 
that the rumours had begun to prevail in various parts of the Tokyo-
Yokohama area as early as the first night of earthquake and spread to each 
town in the region after the second day of the disaster. The rumours 
moved quickly throughout the metropolitan area as waves of refugees 
escaped to the outskirts of the city along major roads. As many earthquake 
survivors testified, they learned about the rumours not only by word of 
mouth, but also through official and non-official channels such as posters 
and megaphones, as well as from newspapers.3 1 The origin of the rumours, 
however, remained vague, and the official record and other testimony 
were often confusing, if not contradictory. Discrepancies appeared; 
records named different sources in various reports. Many official police 
and military documents and the memoirs of political authorities cited 
different and obscure sources for the origin of the rumours. 32 Furthermore, 
the authorities justified proclaiming Martial Law on the second day of the 
earthquake - in force until November 15 - as serving the interests of 
"public security" in response to rumours about Koreans. Many police files 
and Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department records recorded simultaneous 
and sporadic reports of crimes by Koreans in various parts of Tokyo and 
Yokohama, all of which were found baseless, thus implying the difficulty 
in locating the rumours ' exact origin in any logical manner. Nevertheless, 
this data suggests that the rumours began and spread naturally, and that 
they generally spread from Yokohama to Tokyo along the major routes 
that many refugees took. But these facts were never corroborated by clear 
evidence, nor was confession made by suspects who might have spread 
rumours in Yokohama in the first place. 33 
In the midst of this confusion and turmoil concerning the 
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beginning of the massacre, the trial in Saitama prefecture revealed an 
important fact concerning the origin and spread of the rumours. As early 
as the day after the earthquake, a government telegram had ordered 
appropriate measures and urged local officials in each town to organize 
vigilantes against rebellious Koreans. It indicated a potential source of the 
rumours within the government, and also its significant role in spreading 
the rumours to each town in the prefecture. Many survivors remembered 
the warning against armed rebellion of Koreans delivered by police and 
military officers as well as local leaders in their towns.34 Consequently, 
tremendous controversy attached to the involvement of political 
authorities in the origin and spread of the rumours.35 
Questions and heated debate concerning the origin of the rumours 
were not limited to the metropolitan areas. As contemporary newspaper 
reports indicated, news about the controversial post-quake rumours and 
massacre had already spread throughout the entire country from Hokkaido 
to Kyushu as well as to the colony and some other parts of the world -
however limited and inaccurate the news might be - by the time the actual 
prosecution and vigilante trials took place. Thus, controversy and debate 
about causality continued in parliamentary inquiries later that year, but 
without producing any satisfactory answers. In fact, the enigma remains 
today.36 Nonetheless, what became clear was that, in a way, the 
government itself had been an influential purveyor of rumour among the 
people, including the vigilantes, and was perhaps responsible for 
producing it. 37 
Those who protested the trials and supported the vigilantes did 
not miss this point, leading to the second contentious issue: responsibility 
for violence against Koreans. They pointed out that, in fact, many of the 
vigilante groups had been organized and encouraged to participate in 
maintaining social order under police control when there was insufficient 
police force in the post-quake turmoil.38 In addition, from the very first 
day of the earthquake, the military had already been mobilized in Tokyo 
by the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police, and often 
worked with vigilantes in town to maintain public security. In fact, the 
massacre took place under Martial Law that had begun the day following 
the tremors and lasted for the next two and a half months; the scope of 
military mobilization under martial law reached to a force of 52,000 
soldiers and 9,700 horses.39 The trials made it clear that some military and 
police officers as well as local government officials had encouraged or 
condoned armed vigilante organizations as well as their lynching of the 
alleged malcontent Koreans, especially during the first several days 
following the quake. Indeed, the contradictory and confusing policies of 
government and military in the early days were manifest in prohibitions to 
the press not to report rumours while they were circulating emergency 
telegrams against Koreans to local governments across the nation as well 
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196 The Enemy Within 
as to the colonies of Korea and Taiwan.4° Furthermore, political 
authorities circulated posters and announcements about the rumours before 
making an appropriate investigation, and never publicly denounced them 
as false and groundless when it was soon discovered. To many townsmen, 
the dispatch of the military and their warning against the potential danger 
to local communities posed by the rumours seemed not only to verify the 
credibility of charges against the colonized minorities, but also to condone 
the killing of alleged "rebels" against their nation.4 1 
The trials ended, however, without presenting key government or 
military officials as witnesses, nei ther national nor local. And although 
army involvement in the massacre as well as in distributing weapons to the 
vigilantes became clear from evidence introduced in the trials, their 
actions were deemed "appropriate." Furthermore, when over twenty 
thousand Koreans had been interned in police stations beginning on 
September 3 - and in various intern camps across the country two days 
later, with imprisonment lasting for over a month in the name of 
"protection',42 - the internment often functioned as precaution against or 
persecution of the "rebellious Koreans" while forbidding them to go back 
to Korea.43 Overall, only the vigilantes were officially accused and had to 
defend their actions by exposing to public view the government's or 
military's link to the violence through the trials.44 This contestation raised 
the question of responsibility for the massacre among the military, police, 
cabinet, right-wingers, local village leaders, socialists, Koreans, as well as 
the vigilantes and townsmen themselves within the complicated political, 
economic and social context of the Japanese empire in the early 1920s, 
aggravating the tension between, as well as within the state and society. 
As a result, unintentionally, the trials attributed responsibility for the 
massacre not only to the vigilantes but also to various other parties in 
society while presenting an open challenge to public authority concerning 
the government's involvement in rumour mongering and the massacre. 
4. For the Sake of the Japanese Public 
One of the most interesting and conspicuous idioms that appeared 
in these controversial trial debates was "the spirit of kO" (the public) or 
kOkyoshin ("public-spirited mindset"). The vigilantes claimed that their 
activities were based on their "public-minded" and "patriotic" motives in 
an attempt to protect their communities and the nation at a "time of crisis" 
(hijoji). One of the earliest uses of this rhetoric came in a September 13 
public announcement from the Superintendent-General of the 
Metropolitan Police, in an appeal to the people facing increasing vigilante 
violence. The message showed appreciation for vigilante activities that 
stemmed from a "patriotic spirit" (aikokuteki seishin) as well as from 
public-mindedness (kOkyoshin) .45 The rationale behind their rhetoric was 
that their actions were "for the sake of everyone" (minna no tame) or "on 
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behalf of the town" (mura no tame).46 Because they took up arms against 
Koreans out of zeal to protect their communities, the vigilantes on trial 
were "victims" on behalf of their community, town, and the "Japanese 
public." According to contemporary newspaper reports and testimony of 
earthquake survivors, not only the accused but also their townsmen 
appealed for pardons based on this reasoning. Financial support was 
provided for the vigilantes from the town's budgets as well as personal 
care for their families during the trials.47 Indeed, Yoshikawa indicates that 
thousands of people were either watching or participating in many of the 
vigilante crime sites.48 Thus, their loyalty to the "public" should be valued 
and rewarded instead of being punished. In fact, one of the vigilantes in 
the Chiba trials said that he could not tolerate the impending riots by the 
ungrateful colonized subjects when even the Honorable Crown Prince 
(later Emperor Hirohito) was suffering eating low quality rice for his meal 
for the sake of the empire. 49 Some vigilantes, in fact, had simply strolled 
into the police station after committing murder, claiming an award from 
the authorities for loyalty to the nation.50 
Eventually, cases concerning crime and damage against the 
police as well as some accidental murder cases with Japanese victims were 
solved through investigation and resulted in actual prison sentences. But 
there was no official effort at systematic investigation of or adequate 
punishment for the deaths of colonized subjects. 51 While the rumours and 
massacre had primarily and specifically targeted Koreans, thus leaving 
them victims of mass murder, the scope and identities of the Korean 
victims or their families and the location of their corpses did not appear in 
most trial cases.52 The dead could not speak: They appeared only as senjin, 
a pejorative term for Koreans in the trial records.53 The discrepancy in 
verdicts between killing Japanese and Koreans clearly demarcated the 
boundary of the community to be imagined and promoted. Vigilante 
aggression was justified by a clear double standard. With this publicly 
shared logic behind the trial discourse, there ensued not only an official 
pardon of vigilantes' violence on the occasion of the subsequent Crown 
Prince's marriage the following winter but also positive evaluation of 
vigilantes' sacrifice during the post-quake social turmoil. The killers were 
praised for their "public spirit" at such a critical time for the nation. 
Originally, the pre-determined purpose and rationale for the 
arrest of vigilantes were two-fold: First, official arrest and trials were 
aimed at avoiding international criticism for the massacre. Second, they 
were designed to promote smooth rule over Korea as well as to strengthen 
government authority within the Japanese empire. On September 11, as 
chief prosecutor Yamashita reports on official policy toward vigilante 
prosecution, the authority wished to appeal for "their innocence since they 
did not have any evil intention. [But since] it is impossible to bend the 
law, it[s] policy [would be to] seek extremely light penal servitude for the 
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accused [in light of] extenuating circumstances."54 In other words, the 
incident could not be overlooked due to the great degree of public 
brutality, but considering the "excusable" circumstances, the scope of 
arrest and prosecution would be limited to absolutely unavoidable cases 
with clear evidence of crime while postponing trials until more favourable 
times. While the special circumstance in the public announcement referred 
to the natural disaster, policy and discourse at the trials revealed the need 
for an agreeable general consensus to pardon violence against colonized 
subjects, and promote and solidify the meaning of a collective Japanese 
community delineated by an ethnic boundary.55 Indeed, not coincidentally, 
when the actual trials took place, a reporter in the courtroom described the 
atmosphere as exhibiting no seriousness at the site: The judge and accused 
were laughing and smiling throughout the proceedings.56 The incident's 
development thus reveals a series of choices made along multi-layered 
fears of the subjugated people and the crowds, as well as political rivalries 
between the state and society within the structure of Japanese imperialism. 
Above all, regardless of the original intentions of the vigilante trials, trial 
discourse reflected wide-ranging public and private efforts to both 
obfuscate and reveal the nature of the event. In the process, post-
earthquake trial discourse effectively served to establish the excusability 
of the massacre while testifying to the powerful rhetoric of"for the sake of 
the Japanese public" in the multiethnic Japanese empire. 
5. Conclusion: Practice of Violence, Choice of Interpretation 
The trials played a significant role in bringing controversy to the 
surface of public discussion in the Japanese empire. Intentionally or 
unintentionally, the courtroom rhetoric revealed crucial aspects of the 
incident which would never have been exposed had there not been such a 
public outcry, reflecting: one, the recondite nature of the event itself, thus 
followed by controversial debate on the cause of and responsibility for the 
violence57; two, a clearly differentiated treatment of the victims based on 
ethnicity; three, extremely light sentences for such a massive scale of 
killing the innocent; four, compromise of the criteria for moral and legal 
judgment of mass murder cases, thus, making arbitrarily relative social 
justice and the value of human lives58; last, and most important, the 
emergence of a general consensus on vigilante crimes as sacrifice out of 
loyalty to the Japanese public which was clearly demarcated by an 
exclusionary ethnic boundary against colonized subjects. The trials also 
shed light on the dynamic forces at work in creating such an intertwined 
relationship among the various actors and spectators of the event, 
especially reflecting the tension and contestation bet\veen and within the 
state and society.59 Simultaneously, debates to justify the massacre 
revealed a shared mode of rhetoric called public good as a powerful 
excuse for violence, defining what the public meant and whom it should 
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include. Interestingly, by condoning aggression against the colonized, 
government propaganda for assimilation policy was strengthened in the 
empire, but only ironically and as a dilemma, not only within the 
municipal government but also in the Governor-General's Office and in 
the lives of colonial subjects.60 And such competing narratives and shared 
rhetoric of "public" space demarcated by an ethnic boundary continued 
into wartime as well as the postwar era in Japanese society. 61 
In this paper, I focused on controversy in vigilante trials 
following the rumours and the ensuing violence against colonized Koreans 
in the post-quake Japanese empire. Competing narratives and the process 
of justifying collective violence have revealed how the colonized were 
imagined and utilized while the socially transformative categories of 
"Korean-ness" and the "Japanese public" were constructed. In my larger 
project, I examine the context, competing narratives, commemorative 
activities and controversial production of historical knowledge concerning 
the colonial violence in the Japanese empire.62 The continuous narrative-
making process reveals that different responses and multiple choices 
prevailed over the course of the event's unfolding from the moment of 
hearing rumours, practicing and witnessing violence, to interpreting and 
remembering the episode. In the process, individuals responded to 
circumstances in different ways by constantly choosing to practice culture 
and history, and their choices collectively constructed and solidified the 
boundaries of identity. Consensus centred this identity in an ethnically 
exclusive Japanese public. At each stage in this developing history and 
historical knowledge of the moment of collective violence, these multiple 
choices and responses testified to the power of human imagination, which 
ultimately produced competing narratives. The case of the 1923 massacre 
of Koreans in the Japanese empire therefore challenges us to reconsider 
broader issues of historical agency and social choice in the practices of 
culture and history. We can see in these cultural terrains and social 
impacts not only the dynamic effect of the colonized in the metropolis, but 
also the power of human imagination to produce and interpret violence, 
along with the potential for both resisting and recovering from it. 
Notes 
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following the McCune-Reischauer and the Hepburn styles for 
transliteration, respectively. All translations are mine unless specified 
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and Reservists Associations (zaigo gunjinkai) in each town. For further 
discussion on different origins and types of vigilante organizations in 
1920s Japan, see Gendaishi no kai, ed. Kikan gendaishi 9 Nihon 
gunkokushugi no soshiki teki kiban: zaigo gunjinkai to seinendan (Tokyo, 
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137; Yamada Shoji, Kantodaishinsai ji no chOsenjin gyakusatsu : sono 
kokako seining to minshil sekinin (Tokyo, Japan: Soshisha, 2003). 
9 For example, see the students' survey resul t of March 1924, concerning 
their earthquake experiences in Tokyo Nihonbashi Higher Elementary 
School. Rumours about the alleged armed attacks by Koreans were among 
the top in the list of the sources of their fear along with the earthquake and 
fire . See Tokyo shiyakusho and Yorozu chohosha eds., Shinsai kinen 
jfiichi ji goja ha chi fun (Tokyo, Japan: Yorozu chohosha, 1924 ). 
10 Quoted from a student writing in Kyobashi Higher Elementary School 
in Tokyo, reprinted in Kiim Pyong-dong, ed. Kanta daishinsai ChOsenjin 
gyakusatsu mondai kankei shiryo 1 ChOsenjin gyakusatsu kanren jido 
shOgen shiryo (Tokyo, Japan: Ryokuin shobo, 1989), 393. Various 
children's accounts on the earthquake and the massacre in their writings 
and paintings testify to their traumatic experiences of the violence. While 
many of them expressed their shock of the natural disaster, they also 
revealed the mixed feeling of fear, anger, and sympathy toward Koreans in 
their description of the rumours and the violence that followed in their 
neighbourhoods or refuge shelters. 
11 Although the event itself entered most public school history textbooks 
in Japan since the late 1970s, the descriptions are often found in a 
marginal "column" section, and not in the main text. They also lack 
concrete and coherent explanations providing no clear accounts of the 
cause, process, and consequences, thus blurring the issue of responsibility. 
Likewise, most of the existing massacre-related memorials in the Kanto 
area refrain from mentioning the identities of the perpetrators or the 
victims, often dismissing the incident as an unfortunate "accident." 
12 Jean-Noel Kapferer, Rumors: Uses, Interpretations, and Images, trans. 
Bruce Fink (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 
5 and 12. 
13 For example, Rome, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and London, 
to mention a few, also had similar kinds of rumours against minorities 
after great fires or natural disasters. However, the particular kinds of 
rumours that survived and worked in particular societies demand further 
contextualized and interdisciplinary analysis in order to understand the 
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implications, shared social values, and concerns at the time of mass social 
destruction. 
14 Various records of rumours in post-quake Tokyo can be found in 
Keishicho, 1925. 
15 Ch'ae, 165. 
16 A contemporary Christian leader Uchimura Kanzo, an entrepreneur 
Shibusawa Eiji, and a novelist Koda Rohan as well as many other writers, 
religious leaders, and public figures took such a view. For example, see 
Ham Sok-hon, Chugi'tlttae kkaji I g6nlmt1 ro (Seoul, Korea: Hangilsa, 
1996). 
17 Many writers, artists, politicians, activists and religious leaders 
interpreted the meanings of the disaster through numerous written 
accounts of their earthquake experiences in various popular magazines, 
journals, and special collections on the earthquake experiences, especially 
when the publication industry became ever more vigorous and competitive 
in the process of post-quake reconstruction of the metropolis. 
18 For example, see Keishicho, 1925. 
19 Ch'ae, 163. 
20 The Korean independence movements were manifested in the 
establishment of the Interim Government of Korea in Shanghai, attempts 
to assassinate the colonial ruling authorities, and armed struggles in the 
colony and the national border area such as Manchuria. For examples of 
the colonial authorities' prevalent use of the term futei senjin in the late 
191 Os and 1920s, see Kim Chong-ju, Chasen tochi shiryo series 8 Futei 
senjin (Tokyo, Japan: Kankoku shiryo kenkyiijo, 1971). 
21 It was a large-scale peaceful independence movement that was violently 
crushed by the police and the military authorities resulting in six to seven 
thousand deaths of Koreans. 
22 For the records of the official security policy and the legal procedure in 
prosecuting the vigilantes, see Yoshikawa, 1949. Most of the important 
vigilante trial records, including those of Tokyo and Yokohama, and many 
crucial documents in preparation for the trials are not available today since 
they were either destroyed or burnt during the Asian-Pacific War (1931 -
1945). In this regard, this confidential document, prepared for the purpose 
of future reference for post-disaster security issues for internal circulation 
within the Ministry of Justice, provides crucial information concerning 
official policy and procedures of the vigilante prosecution based on 
various original documents from the pre-trial investigation to the arrest of 
the vigilantes. Nevertheless, it does not provide information on the actual 
trials or the following discussions and results of the trials. The document 
ends with the initial arrest procedure. Also note that this record presents a 
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Ministry insider's point of view, rendering the scope and attributing 
responsibility for the incident exclusively to the people ra ther than the 
government or military. Yoshikawa, 32-33. 
23 Yomiuri shinbun reported on the first public trial on November 6, 1923. 
24 The statistics appear in Yoshikawa, 225-228. The trial transcripts that I 
was able to obtain thus far include the records of seven vigilante trials 
from the Prosecutor' s Offices in Saitama and Gunma prefectures, which 
took place bet\veen November 1923 and June 1924. There are also a 
limited number of newspaper reports and a few available official 
documents concerning the trials, which often summarized the atmosphere 
and courtroom outcomes. I would like to thank Professor Yamada Shoji 
and Kiim Pyong-dong for their help in obtaining these valuable trial 
records. 
25 Yoshikawa, 43 ; Gendaishi no kai, 274. 
26 Yoshikawa records 3,412 for the number of Koreans whom the 
vigilantes handed over to either military or police. Yoshikawa, 52. 
27 For detailed accounts of the vigilante activities, see various earthquake 
reports published by different organizations in note 6 as well as newspaper 
reports during the first several months after the disaster, especially after 
October 20 when the official publication censorship was lifted following 
the Japanese government's public announcement concerning the post-
quake violence related to Koreans. 
28 Fujioka and Yorii cases are the examples. On the conflict bet\veen 
police and the crowd in provoking the violence, see Tokyo asahi shinbun 
October 17, 1923. 
29 For example, Fukudamura case. 
30 On the basis and rationale for the Vigilante Association's protest to the 
Ministries of Law and Home Affairs, see Tokyo nichinichi shinbun 
October 22, 1923. 
31 For the vigilantes' criticism of the role of the police during the turmoil, 
see Hochi shinbun October 29, 1923. Also, for expression of the prevalent 
sentiment of strong objection to the arrest policy for the vigilantes, see a 
letter submitted by an anonymous "scholar of law" in To/...-yo nichinichi 
shinbun October 21, 1923 (evening edition). 
32 For the detailed initial reports on the rumours in various parts of the 
metropolitan area, see Kaizosha, 1924; Kanagawaken keisatsubu 
[Kanagawa Prefecture Police Department], ed. Taisha daishinkasaishi 
(Yokohama, Japan: Kanagawaken keisatsubu, 1926); Keishicho, 1925; 
Naimusho, 1926; Tokyoshi, 1926-1927 and other reports on the 1923 
earthquake. For the political and military authorities' accounts of their 
ini tial reactions to the disaster and rumours, see their memoirs in Kang 
and Kum, 1963 and Kiim, 1991. 
. At the Interface/Probing the Boundaries, Volume 47 : Violence : `Mercurial Gestalt?..
: Editions Rodopi, . p 215
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10380510?ppg=215
Copyright © Editions Rodopi. . All rights reserved.
May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher,
except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.
204 The Enemy Within 
33 For example, Kaizosha recorded some liberated inmates' violence in 
Yokohama as the origin of the rumours while Naimusho reports showed a 
similar view but added another element of social unrest caused by 
socialists and Koreans. While the top police and government officials did 
not specify the source of the rumours, the Tokyoshi and Kanagawa-ken 
keisatsubu versions attributed it to the misunderstandings of various trivial 
crimes in the area under the exceptional social circumstance after the 
quake. However, these speculations on the true beginning of the rumours 
were never clearly verified by concrete evidence. 
34 For example, see Ti5kyi5 nichinichi shinbun November 8, 1923. Also, the 
transcripts of the vigilante trials in Jinbohara and Yorii in Saitama clearly 
indicate such warnings against Koreans and orders for self-defense from 
officials. See Urawa District Court records, November 26, 1923. 
35 For the reports of the telegram warning, see Ti5/...-yi5 nichinichi shimbuin 
October 19 and November 8, 1923. 
36 See congressman Nagai Ryfitaro's inquiry in the 481h Diet session in 
Kum, 1991. Also, see Jiyl1 hosodan, ed. Jiyf1 hi5si5dan monogatari senzen 
hen (Tokyo, Japan: Nihon hyoronsha, 1976) for criticism of the lack of 
appropriate investigation by government offices made by contemporary 
lawyers, Yamazaki Kesaya and Fuse Tatsuji's, the points of which still 
remain unresolved today. 
37There were continuing debates on this point in postwar Japan as well. 
For example, see the debates between Kang and Matsuo in Rekishi hyi5ron 
in October 1973. While many Korean and Korean descendent (zainichi) 
scholars of Japan highlight the government officials' hatred toward 
Koreans, and thus, their conspiracy in creating and spreading the rumours 
against Koreans for the purpose of their political manoeuvring, Matsuo 
emphasizes the responsibility of the general populace, pointing to the lack 
of critical evidence that supports this "conspiracy theory" of government 
officials' involvement in creating the rumours. 
38 Many local history publications, police departments' records and 
newspaper articles indicate that the actual history of many of the jikeidan 
can be found in the national and local governments' promotion of such 
self-defence organizations in each town even before the earthquake as well 
as during the event. See Higuchi, 1984; Obinata Sumio, "Keisatsu to 
minshl1: daishinsai o meguru keisatsu to minshl1," Hi5gaku semina 379 
(1986): 134-137. 
39 For example, a navy officer in Funabashi in Chiba prefecture confessed 
that he asked for the vigilantes' help to defend the local military facility 
and gave them "permission" to kill Koreans when necessary. Cited in 
Yoshikawa's record on the preliminary examination report concerning the 
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navy officer's prosecution in Yoshikawa, 72-73 . Also, see the case of a 
local government official's condoning in Saitama prefecture in Ibid, 74. 
Naimusho, 392. 
4
° For relevant government and military documents, see Kum, 1991. 
41 For example, see Tokyo nichinichi shinbun November 13, 1923. 
42 The official record on the number of Korean internees reached 23,715 
all over Japan, including a thousand in a distant region such as Hiroshima. 
For further statistical information on Korean internees, see Yoshikawa, 
182-184. 
43 A recently discovered military police officer's diary in Narashino 
indicates that the military was keeping a close eye on the Korean internees 
for fear of a possible riot or rebellion, and dispatched Korean-speaking 
military spies into the camps. On the discovery of the document in Nagoya 
with an excerpt from the original diary, see Matsuo Takayoshi, 
"Kantodaishinsai to kenpeitai," Ronza (November 2003): 172- 187. The 
Kubono Diary also testifies to military involvement in the massacre in 
Narashino. See Pae So, Shashin hOkoku kantodaishinsai chOsenjin 
gyakusatsu (Tokyo, Japan: Kage shobo, 1988). Note that the government 
and the army employed special security measures for close surveillance on 
Koreans and other non-conformist dissenters on the government blacklist 
(yochlli'nin), immediately after the outbreak of the earthquake. 
44 In fact, there were reports on a frustrated vigilante and a Korean who 
committed suicide in relation to the post-earthquake persecution of 
Koreans. Tok')'O nichinichi shinbun October 25, 1923 (evening edition); 
Fukuoka nichinichi shinbun September 21, 1923. 
45 Reported in Yomiuri shinbun September 15, 1923. 
46 For support for the vigilantes' appeal and their claim of innocence, see 
Tokyo nichinichi shinbun October 21, 1923. For the rhetoric of "the victim 
of the community" and "for the sake of the town," see Tokyo nichinichi 
shinbun October 22, 1923 and November 13, 1923. 
47 For instance, vigilante violence was largely excused in Saitama with the 
prefectural government officials' remarks on the occasion that justified 
their crimes with their motive in "the spirit for the public" (kOIQ'O no 
seishin). See the speech of the former governor of Saitama in Kum, 1991. 
48 Yoshikawa, 56-57. 
49 Tokyo nichinichi shinbun November 29, 1923. 
50 In the special edition of October 20, 1923, Osaka mainichi 
shinbunreported that the vigilantes visited Omiya police station on 
September 4 after their murder of Koreans, and told the officers what they 
had done expressing their wish to be rewarded for their contribution to 
public security. This information came out in the process of investigating 
the case for the prosecution of the vigilantes a month after the crime. 
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51 For example, note the discrepancy in various investigation results 
concerning the number of the massacred: the Ministry of Justice (275), the 
newsletter of the Interim Government of Korea Tongnip shinmun 
[Independence](6,66 I), Tokyo Imperial University professor Yoshino 
Sakuzo (2,613), combined newspaper reports (1,464), and Kokuryiikai 
(722, Tokyo only). Cited in Kang Tok-sang, Seikytl bunka si5sho series 9 
Kanti5daishinsai gyakusatsu no kioku (Tokyo, Japan: Seikyt1 bunkasha, 
2003), 288-293. 
52 Newspaper reports often indicated that the names and identities of the 
massacred Koreans were not known, as in the special edition of Osaka 
mainichi October 20 and 21, 1923. It is extremely difficult to track down 
the exact Korean population in the Kanta area at the time of the disaster. 
Most informed and widely accepted speculation among historians 
indicates approximately 20,000 Koreans living in the area as of the fall of 
1923 out of 60,000 in total across Japan. The number of the massacre 
victims is known to be close to 6,000 considering the estimated total 
population of Koreans in the area, the number of internees as well as 
returnees to Korea. Since the time when Korea became an official colony 
of Japan in 1910, the material and human resources in Korea filled needs 
of the rapidly industrializing and increasingly militarizing Japanese 
empire. Many victims of the massacre were manual labourers responding 
to the labour shortage while suppressing the wage level in the metropolis. 
53 Nevertheless, concerning commemorative activities for massacre 
victims in the empire across the metropolis and the colony, "the dead" 
were powerful enough to evoke various responses and memories, which 
often opened space for political projections onto the present participants 
and the audience, and sti ll resonate discursively constituting historical 
narratives of the event in Korea and Japan to this day. For example, see 
Lee Jin-hee, "Jinken o kangaeru madoguchi to shite no zainichi Korian no 
rekishi to kiikan," Sai 48 (2003b ): 12- 16. 
54 Ti5kyi5 nichinichi shinbun November 2, 1923. 
55 In his response to the earthquake and the massacre on September 23, the 
Governor-General of Korea Saito Makoto expressed his primary concern 
with any detrimental effect of the event on Japan's rule over Korea with 
no mention of relief policy for the Korean disaster refugees in the 
metropolis. His writing also indicated that he did not understand the scope 
of the incident nor the general number of Korean population in the area 
(his speculation on the Korean population in the disaster-affected area was 
not even close to the number of Korean internees in a single camp.) See 
Saito Makoto, "Daishinsai to ryiigen," Chosen chihi5 gyi5sei 2: 10 ( 1923): 
2-3. 
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56 Tokyo nichinichi shinbun November 13, 1923. 
57 After October 20 when the official publication censorship was lifted, 
newspapers were filled with reports concerning the post-quake vigilante 
and Korean violence across the country. However, most of the names and 
identities of those Korean suspects appeared as "unknown senjin 
[Koreans]." For example, see Tokyo nichinichi shinbun October 21, 1923. 
58 For example, the vigilantes' challenge to the political authorities and 
their murder of Japanese were treated more seriously than the cases of 
mass murder of Koreans. Whereas the rates of getting actual prison 
sentence for killing Japanese or attacking police officers were over or 
close to 50 per cent, it was only 16.5 per cent for killing Koreans. See 
Yamada, 2003, I 00-107. 
59 It is important to note that, despite the general consensus on excusing 
vigilante violence, there were efforts to record vigilante aggression and to 
express oppositional voices against the double standard against Koreans 
both by Koreans and Japanese. For example, see the protests following the 
massacre by Koreans in Tang-a ilbo September 9 and December 28, 1923; 
Chason ilbo September 24, 1923; Tongnip shinmun December 5, JO, and 
11 , 1923, and, by Japanese in Jiyfi hosodan, 1976 and Lee Jin-hee, The 
Massacre of Koreans through Paintings (Tokyo, Japan: Korai 
hakubutsukan, 2003a). These non-conformist voices testified to the social 
contestation as well as the internal subjugation within the structure of 
imperialism and colonialism not only in the colony but also in the 
metropolis. 
60 Various post-earthquake policies indicate the efforts of the Governor-
General's Office to effect a greater degree of assimilation of Korea to 
imperial Japan, which include giving compassionate allowance to the 
bereaved families of the Korean victims, and making a propaganda film on 
the Japanese government's generous treatment of the disaster refugees in 
the intern camps. See Tokyo nichinichi shinbun October 15, 1923; Osaka 
asahi October 26, 1923; Osaka mainichi November 7, 1923. The 
Metropolitan Government increased its social surveillance also under the 
Emergency Imperial Ordinance No. 403 since September 7, which was to 
continue as the chian iji ho (Peace Reservation Law) within next two years 
for the sake of"public order." 
61 For continuation of an ethnically bounded sense of "public good" and 
fear of futei senjin in imperial Japan, see the resurgence of similar kinds of 
rumours against Koreans in Japan in KyfishiJ. nippo August 18, 1924; 
Chfigoku shin.bun and Keijo nippo September 2, 1928; Osaka asahi 
September 3, 1928. Nevertheless, critique of the justification of the 
incident also survived and continued into the postwar era as well. For 
example, see the appeal that the Japanese Lawyers' Association submitted 
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to the Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro concerning the violation of 
human rights in the massacre. See Nihon bengoshi rengokai, 2003; Asahi 
shinbun August 25, 2003 (evening edition). 
62 I take the politics of rumour as a window on the complicated context 
and meanings of the massacre, for rumour proved a powerful social 
phenomenon, both motivating and justifying the collective violence. Thus, 
I take the rumours against Koreans as an important site to examine the 
layers of fear within the social body against the colonized, the crowd and 
political authority in imperial Japan. Commemorative activities also 
manifest this complicated structure of fears and multiple meanings of the 
massacre in the discursive construction of collective identities and 
massacre memories in the post-quake Japanese empire. These sites of 
analysis allow me to contemplate the meaning of the violent event beyond 
the limits of colonial archives in modern Japanese and Korean history. 
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